Studies of the emergence and electoral success of new parties frequently suffer from conceptual and methodological flaws: effects of electoral institutions that primarily operate at the level of the constituencies are specified at the national level; central explanatory variables such as electoral demands and competitors' responses are measured with crude proxies; the interplay of formation and success is overlooked; and empirical models neglect the point that the underlying data may exhibit dependencies both in space and time. In this article, we highlight these problems and offer some potential solutions using the Swiss Green Party (GPS) as an empirical case.
response of established parties towards changing demands (e.g. Hug, 2001; Meguid, 2005) , and the permissiveness of institutional arrangements that govern the supply of new parties (e.g. Willey, 1998) . However, the question of which of these factors are important at which stage is still a matter of ongoing dispute, and previous empirical findings are partially conflicting about that (see Hug, 1996; Redding and Viterna, 1999) . While Hug (1996) has already criticized the eclectic theoretical underpinnings of the new party literature and has raised methodological concerns about 'selection bias' in the study of party formation and success (Hug, 2000 ; see also Golder, 2003; Jackman and Volpert, 1996) , we will try to bring the discussion forward in some other, partially related respects. First and foremost, effects of electoral institutions that primarily operate at the level of electoral districts are usually specified at the national level, albeit often with measures originally tailored for the constituency level. Second, central explanatory variables such as competitors' responses to electoral demands are frequently measured with crude proxies of questionable validity. Third, empirical models of party formation and success regularly neglect that the underlying cross-country, multi-period data are simultaneously structured in space and time. Inferences are therefore potentially biased and inefficient, and they do not fully exploit the information available from the data.
We will highlight our major points using the Green Party of Switzerland (GPS) as an empirical case. The GPS is particularly suitable in this regard since it was one of the first 'new politics' parties to enter the electoral arena in 1975, and the first green party in Western Europe to achieve parliamentary representation in 1979 (see Church, 1992 ). Thus, we are able to follow the GPS's electoral fortunes over quite a long time period. Second, while formally a system of proportional representation (PR), the Swiss electoral law divides the country into 26 constituencies ranging from single-member districts (SMDs) to large districts with 35 seats, and therefore resembles the manifold institutional arrangements usually to be found in cross-national comparisons. Third, the frequency of the usage of direct democratic instruments in Switzerland provides the opportunity to develop new measures of electoral demands and established parties' responses at the level of the constituencies, which would otherwise be limited by data availability.
Representation Thresholds
Many authors have claimed that permissive electoral institutions are necessary for the rise of new parties. In particular, it has been argued that SMD plurality systems are inhospitable to new parties, while PR electoral systems promote their emergence. Empirical evidence from cross-national studies is mixed. While the work of several authors supports this conjecture (Golder, 2003; Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Redding and Viterna, 1999; Tavits, 2006; Willey, 1998) , others barely find any differences between types of electoral systems in new parties' presence, frequency and strength (Harmel and Robertson, 1985; Hauss and Rayside, 1978; Meguid, 2005; Van der Brug et ai., 2005) . Muller-Rommel (1993) even finds a negative relationship between the electoral system's proportionality and new parties' success.
To be sure, conflicting findings may also result from varying data sources, model specifications and the like. However, our central concern is that most studies of new parties use district-level rationales to theoretically motivate, and essentially district-level measures to empirically determine the institutional openness at the national level. At the district level, it is well known that the minimum vote share with which it is possible to win at least one parliamentary seat (the threshold of representation) can be defined purely in terms of the number of seats to be allocated and the number of parties competing (Gallagher, 1991; Rae et ai., 1971) . The logic behind this is intuitive: the lower the district magnitude and the lower the number of competitors, the higher is the threshold of representation and the higher the risk for potential voters of wasting their votes on hopeless candidates and parties, and, thus, the lower the incentives of new parties to enter the race. But the same simplicity does not apply to the national electoral arena as a whole. 1 At the national level, openness as defined in terms of the minimum required vote share to achieve parliamentary representation also hinges on the size of the national assembly (Taagepera, 1998 (Taagepera, , 2002 , the existence of uppertier corrections of the vote-seat disproportionalities potentially emanating from the district level (Taagepera, 2002) , the geographical distribution of electoral groups (Bischoff, 2004) , and the institutional incentives of parties to coordinate beyond the district level (Cox, 1997 (Cox, , 1999 .
Hence, the many cross-national studies of new parties that use simple SMD-PR dichotomies (e.g. Harmel and Robertson, 1985; Hauss and Rayside, 1978; Redding and Viterna, 1999) , or (transforms of) average and median district magnitudes to measure institutional openness (e.g. Hug, 2001; Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Meguid, 2005; Tavits, 2006; Willey, 1998) may have drawn false inferences about its effects on the formation and success of new parties. Indeed, Taagepera (2002) has found that SMD plurality systems do not necessarily generate higher nationwide thresholds of representation than PR systems, which may also explain the weak and inconsistent findings pertaining to new parties reported above. One solution to this problem would be to use one of the recently developed nationwide threshold indices (Bischoff, 2004; Gallagher and Mitchell, 2005; Ruiz-Rufino, 2007; Taagepera, 1998 Taagepera, ,2002 , although the dispute over which factors have to be considered in measuring national openness is still to be settled. For the time being, the easier and safer solution is probably to switch the analytical focus to the district level, where we have clearer theoretical expectations and operational expressions of the openness of electoral institutions to new parties.
Therefore, in our empirical study of the GPS 1975-2003, we will measure openness -or, to be exact, its opposite -in terms of the threshold of representation of district i = 1, 2, ... , 26 at election t = 1, 2, ... , 8, which is 1/(mit + nit -1) for the D'Hondt electoral formula (see Rae et aI., 1971) , where mit is the number of seats to be allocated and nit is the number of competitors. 2 The threshold of representation in our sample varies from 0.02 to 0.50 of the electorate, with a mean of 0.15, and thus almost fully covers its theoretical range. 3
Electoral Demands
Early accounts of the emergence of left-libertarian and green parties in Western Europe have emphasized shifts towards postmaterialist value orientations due to the socioeconomic prosperity of the 1950s and 1960s (e.g. Inglehart, 1990) . Conversely, rising anti-immigrant sentiment in the wake of economic crisis has been held liable for the success of right-wing populist parties from the mid-1980s on (e.g. Ignazi, 1992) . While survey research has consistently demonstrated a strong link between value orientations and individual propensities to vote for new parties (e.g. Inglehart, 1990) , the same does not always apply for the incidence and electoral strength of new parties across countries and over time (see Hug, 2001; Tavits, 2006) . Empirical findings from studies that use sociostructural indicators (population size, economic growth, unemployment rates, ete.) by proxy of voters' attitudes and orientations have been equally mixed (e.g. Hug, 2001) .
Considering that structural variables are rather crude measures of electoral demands whose effects are not easy to interpret substantively (see Tavits, 2006) , we should devise an indicator of electoral demands that is as close as possible to the voters' wants and needs. Unfortunately, direct survey measures are usually unavailable at the level of electoral districts. Thus, it becomes particularly obvious here that although the switch-over to the district level resolves some previous conceptual and operational issues, these virtues do not come free of charge. In order to measure electoral demands at the district level, we take advantage of Switzerland's heavy use of direct democracy. In particular, we have selected 92 national referendums and initiatives on environmental protection and transportation infrastructure issues,4 and have set up a simple random intercepts models of the logit of the district-level election outcomes 0 on propositions k as measured by the share of voters favouring the GPS's position on respective propositions:
where a is a proposition-specific intercept, 8 is a random variable that represents the 'greenness' of the electorate of a district i at time t,6 and £ is a randomly distributed error term. Note that t is actually a period that covers all the referendums held between the last elections at t -1 and the current election at t. Fitting this model to our data generates a very large number of parameter estimates which are of secondary importance here. We therefore only report the estimated proportion of variance in ) that is due to (Jit which is 0.34. In other words, one-third of the variability in direct legislation election outcomes across districts and time is due to the random term we use to measure green electoral demands in district i at time t.7
Competitors' Responses
The responsiveness of established parties to such new electoral demands has frequently been considered crucial in explaining the rise of new parties. For instance, the breakthrough of the German green party has mainly been attributed to the deafness of the then-governing social-liberal coalition towards growing electoral concerns about the nuclear arms race and environmental issues (e.g. Poguntke, 1993) . While some researchers have used party manifestos data to directly measure competitors' responses in order to determine their effect on new parties (e.g. Meguid, 2005; Van der Brug et aI., 2005) , most studies have inferred, rather than observed, competitors' responses to the rise of new electoral demands from political system features that potentially impinge on the utilities that established parties have from reacting to such demands (e.g. Hug, 2001; Kitschelt, 1988; Miiller-Rommel, 1993; Tavits, 2006) . For example, Hug (2001) defines such 'benefits of high demands' in terms of the presence of majoritarian governments, the frequency of government turnovers, the degree of state centralization, and the frequency of referendums. Irrespective of how prudent the hypothesized mechanisms underlying the relationship between these features and the incentives for established parties to actually respond are, these are relatively far proxies of the concept of interest. Once again capitalizing on Switzerland's heavy use of direct democracy, we use the voting recommendations of the four largest parties (Liberals, Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, People's Party) on the 92 propositions at stake. The competitors' responses to electoral demands is then operationalized as the average share of competitors j in district i in the period preceding election t that gave out the same recommendations on propositions k to their voters as the GPS did. 8 At first glance, this measure does not seem to be prone to produce much variance across districts. However, the number and configuration of parties competing varies tremendously across Swiss districts, and so does the share of competitors giving out 'green' voting recommendations. Moreover, districtlevel party sections sometimes deviate from their national party's recommendations, thus inducing further variability into the political opportunities of the GPS.
A Dynamic Selection Model of New Party Entry and Electoral Success
Already, in an early review of the literature, Harmel (1985: 413) pointed out 'the importance of carefully maintaining the distinction between formation and success in generating and testing theory involving new parties'. Indeed, the entry of new parties into the electoral arena and their subsequent success may be driven by different rationales. At the same time, entry and success are closely related, since a party that is not up for election cannot win votes and, ultimately, seats. Moreover, the decision to form a party and to run for office presumably depends on that party's prospects of winning votes and seats to begin with. If true, a party's decision to enter and its electoral success is a self-selective process, and the analysis of such processes may cause methodological problems related to the notion of 'selection bias' (e.g. King et aI., 1994) . Adequate modelling strategies have been introduced in labour market economics (e.g. Heckman, 1979) , and have been applied in the study of new parties as well (Golder, 2003; Hug, 2000; Jackman and Volpert, 1996) . However, previous empirical applications of such selection models have been static in that they focused on the formation of new parties and their initial electoral success (e.g. Hug, 2001 ). Others have not fully incorporated the dynamics inherent in their data (e.g. Golder, 2003; Jackman and Volpert, 1996) , with potentially negative consequences for the consistency and efficiency of parameter estimates (see e.g. Stimson, 1985) . In the following paragraphs, we will set up an explicitly dynamic model of green party entry and success in Swiss national elections, 1975 Swiss national elections, -2003 Our dependent variable is the logit of the GPS's vote share v in district i at election t, i.e. .lO Yit will only be observed if the GPS decides to nominate a candidate or a list in a district-election year dyad, that is, if d it = 1, otherwise O. We have hypothesized in the preceding sections that both the GPS's decision to run and its electoral success are a function of electoral demands, competitors' responses, and the threshold of representation in i at t. If the relationship between the decision to enter the race and subsequent electoral success was fully determined through these variables, we could model entry and success separately. Selection bias in inferring the impact of our covariates on success arises when additional unobserved characteristics influence the entry decision, and when these unobserved traits are correlated with our covariates. A typical solution to this problem is either to model sequentially the entry decision as a function of observables and to use the residuals as an additional covariate in the vote share model accounting for the unobservables, or, equivalently, to set up the models of entry and success as a system of simultaneous equations with correlated errors:
where the latent response d it >:. of the selection equation represents the propensity of the GPS to enter a race, so that the observed decision d it will be 1 if d i / > 0; Zit and X it are vectors of covariates that also include a constant term; the ys and f3s are parameters to estimate; f.1li and f.12i are district-specific error terms with zero means and variances V1 2 and V2 2 that account for potential clustering;l1 elit and e2it are idiosyncratic error terms specific to district-election dyads with variances 1 and (52, respectively. Given these distributional assumptions, Equation (2) is a random intercepts pro bit model of the entry decision, Equation (3) is a linear random intercepts model of electoral success, and both equations are linked through correlated errors at the idiosyncratic level, p(idiosyncratic) = cov(elit, e2it)/1(5, and at the level of
All of the parameters can be simultaneously estimated with maximum likelihood methods (see Vella, 1998) . While the random intercepts f.1li and f.12i account for unobserved timeinvariant district traits that affect the decision to enter and subsequent electoral success (i.e. trait dependence), entry and results at previous elections may also influence present decisions and success (i.e. state dependence). For example, a group of activists might have formed a party section despite unfavourable conditions (i.e. low electoral demands, intense competition and high representation thresholds) in district i at election t -1. Having already taken the costs of party formation, this section will probably enter the race at the present election at t as well, regardless of the structural conditions and potentially bad success at the previous elections. If true, the coefficients yof the selection equation (2) will be conditional on the previous entry decision. We therefore re-specify the fixed part of the selection equation as yoZit + OZitdit-l, where coefficients Yo pertain to situations in which the GPS did not enter the previous race, and Yl = Yo + 0 pertain to situations where they did, since, when d it -1 = 0, the OZit part of the model is zeroed out. In the outcome model, we also include the respective lagged dependent variable Yit-l in X it , in order to separate trait from state dependence and to capture temporally correlated errors. 12 At this point, we also allow Zit to contain another variable that does not appear in X it , although this is typically not necessary for identification in parametric estimation (see Vella, 1998) : the number of signatures per 1000 voters required for accessing the ballot (petition requirements).13 Petition requirements are assumed purely to affect the decision to enter the race, but not electoral success (see Hug, 2000) .
Results
For expository purposes, we initially fit an 'empty model', i.e. a model that contains only the fixed and random intercepts (not reported in Table 1 district-election specific variables uniformly affect both the entry decision and subsequent electoral success. IS Thus, there is initial evidence of trait dependence and self-selection. In the next step, we introduce the covariates into our model (see Table 1 ). 16 As to the substantive variables, higher thresholds of representation drastically reduce the GPS's propensity to enter the race. Keeping other variables constant at their means, the entry probability predicted from the model estimates is 0.81 in the most permissive electoral districts (representation threshold set to 0.02), and close to 0 in the most inhospitable districts (threshold set to 0.5). Interestingly, this effect is even stronger in districts where the Greens stood for elections before. However, the respective parameter estimate has a huge standard error, since there are very few instances where the GPS actually ran under high representation thresholds. Not unexpectedly, the other covariates -electoral demands, competitors' responses and petition requirements -no longer affect current entry decisions, once the GPS has already entered the race. Nevertheless, and contrary to the weak and ambiguous findings reported above, the GPS has been highly responsive to the political opportunities provided by the electoral institutions. Curiously, the threshold of representation has a positive effect on the vote shares, indicating that the voters have not punished but rewarded the GPS entering the race under unfavourable institutional conditions. However, regression diagnostics identify one outlying and extremely influential observation that is exclusively responsible for this finding, namely the 2003 election in the single-member district of Uri, where the GPS's candidate received a vote share of 31 percent (although he did not eventually win the seat). This extraordinary result was a consequence of successful electoral coordination efforts that prevented the GPS's main contender (the Social Democrats) from nominating its own candidate. Excluding the 2003 election in Uri from the sample, the parameter estimate for the threshold of representation drops to 0.64 (p = 0.92) in the outcome equation. 17 However, this does not mean that electoral coordination has worked perfectly during the whole observation period. While the negative coefficient in the selection equation indicates that an increasing extent to which the major competitor parties embrace the GPS's core issues has depressed the probability of entering the race, there is also a significantly negative estimate in the outcome equation. Hence, there have been instances in which the GPS decided to nominate candidates despite responsive competitors. In these instances, the voters presumably voted strategically in favour of the larger and therefore more promising competitor. Finally and expectedly, electoral demands have a positive effect both on entry and success. However, the estimates founder on conventional thresholds of significance, with p-values of 0.15 each. Thus, once again, shifting electoral demands prove insufficient in the explanation of the rise of new parties. Turning now to the variance structure parameters, several changes compared to the empty model are noteworthy. First, the inclusion of the covariates more or less fully accounts for the previously observed differences in entry propensities between districts. The variance of the random district intercepts is now close to O. The random intercept variance in the outcome equation is also reduced by one-third but is still significant at p < 0.10.
Moreover, the correlation between the error terms at the idiosyncratic level is no longer significant. Hence, the relationship between the decision to enter the race and subsequent electoral success is largely determined through the covariates, and selection bias does not seem to be a problem in this case. However, these comforting results would have been dangerous to assume and difficult to know without a model set up that does allow for explicit tests and corrections.
Conclusion
In this article we have identified some potential problems with previous studies of new parties' entry and success. Most importantly, effects of electoral institutions that primarily operate at the level of electoral districts have been regularly specified at the national level. As opposed to the hitherto inconsistent findings, we have been able to demonstrate that district-level electoral institutions played an outstanding role in determining whether the GPS, as our empirical case, stood for elections or not. Future comparative studies would therefore be well advised either to switch the analytical focus to the district level where votes are cast and seats are allocated (e.g. Cox, 1997) or to devise sensible and truly national measures of the permissiveness of electoral institutions. This development is just in its early stages (see Bischoff, 2004; Ruiz-Rufino, 2007; Taagepera, 1998 Taagepera, , 2002 . However, the latter strategy probably is more fruitful, since the switch-over to the district level entails measurement problems regarding other central variables that are hard to resolve in countries that do not provide an equally rich variety of local-level information on voters' and parties' preferences as does Switzerland with its heavy use of direct democracy. These factors, especially the competitors' responses to electoral demands, have been demonstrated to be crucial for explaining our empirical case. Finally, we have sketched an easily applicable panel selection framework that seems particularly appropriate for the modelling of new parties' entry and success with its inherent dynamics -regardless of whether the analytical scope is inter-or sub-national. Gauglhofer (1988) . Our panel is not completely balanced since the canton of Jura gained autonomy from Bern in 1979, and some of the smaller cantons held 'tacit elections' during the observation period (see the Appendix). 3 Detailed descriptives are provided in the Appendix. 4 In doing so, we have followed the classification scheme of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. These data are available online at http://www.statistik.admin.ch. A list of the referendums and initiatives considered is also provided in the Appendix. 5 Conceptually this model is similar to dynamic item response (IRT) models and dynamic ideal point estimators that have, for example, been used to determine the position of parliamentarians and judges in a political space (see e.g. Martin and Quinn, 2002 Elhorst (2003) . 10 Bounded variables are also susceptible to exhibit skew, multimodality and heteroskedasticity, thus violating the normal regression assumptions. With one notable exception to be dealt with later on, regression diagnostics suggest that this is not a problem here. 11 In order to yield consistent estimates, the additional assumption has to hold that no omitted explanatory district-level variable is correlated with the included covariates. Unfortunately, the usual specification tests are hardly applicable in situations where some of the covariates are more or less time-invariant (viz. the representation thresholds). The least we could do was to estimate and visually inspect the Empirical Bayes residuals at the district level. Despite being quite familiar with the Swiss political landscape, we were not able to identify any consistent pattern that would point to omitted variables. 12 The initial condition, i.e. the state of the dependent variable before the start of the observation period in 1975, is 0 both for the vote share and the entry decision. Since the logit of 0 is undefined, we have added an arbitrary vote share of .001 in the calculation of Yit. 13 Such exclusion restrictions are essential for identification in non-parametric estimation of selection models (see Vella, 1998) . Although the national election law seeks equal petition requirements across cantons, we profit from the fact that the law classifies the districts according to their population size in a relatively crude manner (see Lutz and Strohmann, 1998) . This crude classification generates considerable variation in petition requirements both over time and districts (see the Appendix for descriptives). 14 We have used GLLAMM, a Stata program for generalized linear latent and mixed models, to estimate the parameters (see Rabe-Hesketh et aI., 2005) . The parametrization of mixed response models in GLLAMM differs from the notation used here. For parametrization and equivalences, see Rabe-Hesketh (2002) . Corresponding Stata code is available from the authors. 15 To be sure, error correlation at the level of districts would not bias the parameters of interest whatsoever, since the random intercepts are explicitly included to capture eventual unobserved heterogeneity at this level. However, in some situations it might be of substantive interest to separate error correlation between the levels. 16 Residual diagnostics of the standardized Empirical Bayes predictors of the random effects did reveal a slightly negatively skewed distribution of the regional effects in the outcome equation. Otherwise, no irregularities were detected. 17 The other estimates are hardly affected by the exclusion. Detailed results are available from the authors. 
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